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The Problematics of Representation
in Community Mediation Hearings:
Implications for Mediation Practice
ANGELA GARCIA

University of Cincinnati
Department of Sociology

Empoweringdisputantsto representthemselves and createtheir own agreement is a frequently cited goal of community mediation programs. This
paper explores how disputants' positions and interests are represented in
mediation, and investigates the implications of such representationfor the
negotiation process. This narrative analysis of transcripts of videotaped
community mediation hearings shows that disputant self-representation
in mediation is never unconstrained. The interactional organization of
mediation and the actions of mediators work to limit and define how disputantsformulate their utterances.Mediator representationof disputants
varies in the degree of intervention or coercion applied. Mediators may
limit themselves to rephrasing,restating,or elaboratinga disputant's position. However, in some cases mediators take the place of disputants in
negotiations. The implications of these various types of representationfor
disputant autonomy, mediator neutrality and agreement compliance are
discussed.

Introduction
Mediation is a non-adversarial conflict resolution procedure
which provides an alternative to litigation in divorce and child
custody cases (Saposnek, 1983), civil disputes, juvenile cases, and
even criminal cases (Felstiner and Williams, 1978). Rather than
handing authority for making a decision over to a judge, disputants in mediation hearings retain that authority and negotiate
an agreement with the help of a third party (Merry and Silbey,
1986; Cobb and Rifkin, 1991, p. 47). Mediation emphasizes cooperation and compromise (Worley and Schwebel, 1985; Cahn,
1992), and de-emphasizes the adversarial nature of disputing
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which tends to be exacerbated in litigation (Girdner, 1985). Mediation practitioners believe this approach reduces the antagonism between disputants, gives them the opportunity to listen
to and understand each other's position, and promotes reconciliation (Bottomley, 1985, p. 162; Dingwall, 1986, p. 10; Roberts,
1988, p. 538; Folberg, 1983, p. 9). When compared to adjudication,
mediation strives to empower the disputants, to allow them to
represent themselves, and to limit the authority of the mediator
(Moore, 1986, p. 14).
However, some critics have suggested that the very characteristics of mediation that provide these advantages over more
legalistic approaches to conflict resolution also create some potential problems (e.g., Merry, 1989). Bottomley (1985) argues that
although intended to empower the powerless, informal justice
may be less just than traditional processes. The informality of
the process allows more powerful interactants to gain the upper
hand, and allows the powers that be to define and impose community norms and moral standards (Bottomley, 1985).
Cobb and Rifkin's (1991) study of community-based mediation hearings shows that although there is a rhetoric of neutrality
among mediation practitioners and advocates, the nature of the
mediation process militates against actual neutrality. The first storyteller in the mediation hearing uses that opportunity to set the
moral stage for the hearing: characterizing their own position as
right and good, and that of the opposing disputant as wrong and
bad. Mediators unwittingly aid in the process of reaffirming the
"primary narrative" by orienting to the issues raised by the first
story as they facilitate the hearing. Unless mediators successfully
aid the second disputant in promoting an "alternative narrative"
which challenges the moral framework established by the primary narrative, they have failed in their goal of constructing the
mediation hearing as a "neutral" process (Cobb and Rifkin, 1991).
In fact, Cobb and Rifkin argue that the possibility of a neutral
mediation process may be a chimera because of the power of
narratives to create moral frameworks, establish positions, and
define right and wrong.
Greatbatch and Dingwall (1989) discovered in their study of
British divorce mediation hearings that mediators can exert a
great deal of control over the outcome of the hearing by controlling
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what topics are discussed. Even without explicitly violating neutrality (e.g., by taking a position relative to a disputant's complaint
or proposed solution) a mediator can shape that complaint or
proposal by shifting the discussion from one topic to the next.
Greatbatch and Dingwall (1989) refer to this strategy as "Selective
Facilitation." In the example they cite in their paper, the mediator
moves talk away from the proposal supported by one disputant
to the other disputant's favored proposal. The second proposal
gets adopted, in part because the first one was not discussed.
Mediators' actions thus shape the narrative which is conjointly
produced by the coordinated actions of the participants.
Kolb (1981) found that mediators differ in the amount of control they attempt to exercise over the dispute resolution process.
Kolb's (1981) research on state and federal labor mediators identified two strategies of mediation: deal-making and orchestration.
Kolb characterizes the orchestrating mediator as one who sees
his or her role primarily as that of facilitator or go-between. His
or her job is to represent each side's position to the other. The
deal-making mediator, on the other hand, takes a much more
active role in the process. He or she will argue with disputants,
state opinions relative to proposals, decide what is a reasonable
solution and try to achieve that outcome.
Kolb's study shows how state and federal labor mediators
are able to help disputants create an agreement. However, because the philosophy and goals of community-based mediation
programs differ from that of labor mediation, mediator strategies
such as the "deal-making" role Kolb (1983) identifies may not be
appropriate in this context. A primary goal of community mediation is to provide a mode of conflict resolution which empowers
disputants to make their own decisions instead of having a third
party impose a solution on them. Do mediators in community
mediation programs employ roles similar to the "deal-making"
role state labor mediators use? If so, is this an appropriate use of
power in the community mediation context?
In this paper I address this issue by analyzing how disputants'
positions are represented in mediation hearings. While disputants
do have opportunities to represent themselves in mediation, their
options for self-expression are limited in terms of when, to whom,
and about what they may speak. When mediators represent
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disputants, which occurs frequently, there are three types of representation possible. First, mediators may represent a disputant's
expressed position by repeating or rephrasing it. Second, mediators may make statements consistent with a disputant's expressed
position, but which go beyond merely rephrasing what was actually said. Third, mediators may create their own arguments,
without specific reference to what the disputant has stated. In
this case the mediator is not simply representing the position of
a disputant, she or he is taking the place of the disputant and
acting as if she or he were a first party to the dispute rather than
a neutral third party.1 When mediators replace a disputant in an
exchange with the opposing disputant, they are also engaged in
intervening in that disputant's self representation.
Thus, the types of representation which occur in mediation
may be described as a continuum, with disputant self expression
providing the most autonomy, and mediators replacing the disputant providing the least. In the concluding section I discuss the
implications of these findings for the practice of mediation.
Data
The setting I analyze is a mediation program sponsored by a
California county. This program serves as an alternative to small
claims court for cases such as landlord-tenant disputes, consumer
complaints, monetary disputes, and disputes between neighbors
or family members.
I videotaped all nine hearings held during a six month period.
The hearings ranged from forty minutes to almost three hours
in length. The entire collection consists of over twenty hours
of tape, and involves forty-three participants. Audio tapes were
transcribed using a modified version of Gail Jefferson's transcription system (see Atkinson and Heritage, 1984).
In the program I study, each hearing is chaired by two mediators. 2 The disputants (referred to as "complainant" and "respondent") represent themselves, and may bring witnesses or written
statements from witnesses to support their case. If a mediated
agreement is not reached, the mediators become arbitrators and
make a decision for the disputants. Mediation proponents see
arbitration as a less desirable alternative because the decision is
made by a third party rather than the disputants (Girdner, 1985).
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Methods
I conduct a narrative analysis of the tapes and transcripts of
these hearings. I also draw upon ethnomethodological conversation analytic research on the organization of interaction and
mediation. Conversation analysis involves a detailed, qualitative
study of talk in its sequential context (see, for example, Heritage,
1984; Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, 1974).
Although much previous research addresses mediation and
related topics such as negotiation and bargaining, there are two
major gaps in these bodies of research. The first is a lack of focus
on the mediation hearing as an interactional event. For example,
evaluation studies of mediation tend to treat mediation as a "black
box," studying the impact of various variables (e.g., difficulty of
dispute, skill of mediator) on outcomes (e.g., Bahr, 1981; Felstiner
and Williams, 1978; Girdner, 1985; Thoennes and Pearson, 1985;
Kelly and Gigy, 1989). But as Dingwall (1986) argues, such survey
or questionnaire-based research doesn't capture what actually
happens in the hearing. Such studies neglect the process of mediation, or only study it indirectly via post hoc reports of participants.
Research on negotiation is concerned with predicting the effect of various negotiation strategies (e.g., Pruitt, 1991) and negotiator characteristics and perspectives (e.g., Carrol and Paynes,
1991; Pinkley, 1990; Rubin, Kim, and Peretz, 1990) on outcomes.
This generally experimental research also neglects to explore the
interactional process. Research on bargaining exchanges focuses
on power differences between participants in different positions
in networks, but does not study the process of bargaining itself,
and does not study the participants' role in creating social structure and bargaining outcomes through their actions (e.g., Cook
and Emerson, 1978; Cook, Emerson, Gillmore, and Yamagishi,
1983; Molm, 1987; Skvoretz and Wilier, 1991). By analyzing the
interactional process of these hearings the current paper will show
how the actions of mediators affect negotiations.
The second gap is failure to make the connection between the
interactional organization of talk in an institutional setting and
how participants accomplish the goals of that setting. Studies
that do focus on the interactional process, and conduct direct
examinations of participants' behavior in mediation hearings
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(e.g., Greatbatch and Dingwall, 1989; Kolb, 1983; Cobb and Rifkin,
1991; Garcia 1991) have not as yet addressed the question of how
disputants' positions are represented.
The Interactional Organization of Mediation
In these data a mediator opens the hearing, explains the mediation process, makes introductions, and then solicits the
complainant's story. The complainant's story thus precedes the
respondent's. Disputants do not begin their stories until after
the mediator solicits them. After the initial stories are completed,
mediators may solicit second or even third stories from the disputants. The disputants may not interrupt each other during their
stories, but the mediators may interrupt to ask questions or refocus the topic.
The turn-taking system of mediation differs in several respects from that of ordinary conversation (Garcia 1991). 3 While
disputants have the floor to tell their stories, they are free to selfselect as next speaker, and to speak even when not selected by a
mediator. However, they do not use the full range of turn-taking
options that would be available to them in ordinary conversation.
Specifically, disputants generally refrain from selecting an opposing disputant to speak. However, they may select a mediator by
asking a question. Disputants rarely speak during the opposing
disputant's story (Garcia 1991).
These hearings also have extended periods of discussion, primarily comprised of question-and-answer sequences. The organization of the discussion phase differs from ordinary conversation
in that mediators control the topic of discussion and who participates. The mediators use directed questions to switch the talk
from one disputant to the other (Garcia 1991).
While participants in ordinary conversation are not restricted
as to when they can be the recipient of an utterance or select specific others to speak (Sacks et al., 1974), disputants' participation
statuses in mediation hearings are predetermined. 4 Disputants
address their utterances to the mediators rather than to their codisputants. The mediators can address utterances to either disputant, and can conduct dyadic exchanges with each disputant in
turn. The disputants, on the other hand, address their utterances
to mediators, not the other disputant (Garcia 1991).
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In sum, the speech exchange system of mediation provides
for specific types of actions by disputants and mediators. The
next sections show how this interactional organization affects the
representation of disputants' positions.
Disputant Self-Representation
Disputants participate in mediation because they were not
able to resolve their dispute informally. Thus the less restrictive
type of speech exchange system, that of ordinary conversation, is
not likely to be productive in the mediation context. Disputants
rarely use the format of ordinary conversation during mediation
hearings, but when they do, they often argue (Garcia 1991). These
types of exchanges may be counter-productive to the dispute
resolution process. Disputants expressing themselves without regard to mediation format are generally sanctioned by mediators
(Garcia 1991).
For example, consider Excerpt 1 from a dispute between a
divorced couple over custody, child support, and visitation arrangements for their three children. 5 In lines 1-3 the complainant
explains why he doesn't want to give up some of his visitation
time with the children. The respondent, his former wife, overlaps
his utterance in lines 4 and 5, accusing him of wanting her to abort
their first child ("Sharon"), thus discrediting and undermining his
claim to be a caring father. The mediator tries to intervene in the
incipient dispute (line 6), but is interrupted by the complainant
who produces another disputing move in lines 7,9, 10 and 12). As
the argument escalates, the Mediator again intervenes and stops
the dispute (lines 13-16).
Excerpt 1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

C:

R:
M:
C:
M:
C:

YEAH, I you know? I still don't feel good about it,
because like this is my flesh and blood! You know, and
you know, uh, I['m yeah-]
[But I you shouted abortion, for nine
months! [with Sharon]
[Listen, we I are not=
=Hey,=
=talking (a[bout) 1
[WHO ]
had the abortion? Y[ou want to get] SMART?
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M:

C:
M:
M:

15
16

[Wait a minute!]

DIDN'T SH[E JUST] HAVE ONE?
[Hey wait!]
HOLD IT! WE'RE NOT IN HERE TO TALK ABOUT THAT.
I DIDN'T TALK ABOUT MY PROBLEMS, OR WHATEVER
WE'VE ALL GOT A STORY. That's no one's business.

Even when the disputants speak for themselves, they are still
under control of the mediators. Here, a mediator exercises her
right and responsibility to sanction and stop arguments, which are
a breach of the speech exchange system of mediation. Mediators
also control disputant's self-representations by limiting the topic
of talk. In the example above, the mediator specifically identifies
some unacceptable topics of talk in lines 14-16. This example
also shows that disputant self-representation may not facilitate
conflict resolution, because it may lead to arguing or irrelevant
utterances.
The more common scenario in these hearings is for disputants
to speak for themselves, but within the constraints of the speech
exchange system of mediation. Excerpt 2 from a hearing between
a divorced father and his children's step father shows a complaint
and the response to that complaint. The mediator's only participation in this exchange is to solicit the respondent's answer to the
complaint (line 9). In the speech exchange system of mediation
disputants are supposed to address their remarks to the mediators, rather than to each other, and to wait until selected to speak
by the mediator instead of selecting themselves as next speaker
(Garcia 1991). Thus the interactional organization of mediation
constrains how disputants can represent themselves in mediation.
Excerpt 2
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

RA:

All I do want, from Mart, is civility, yes, and number one,
on the list, before civility is I want to be free, to raise my
children, in a manner that I want to. And I don't want any
interruptions. And that's all! It's very simple. The only
time we, you know, the only time that there are problems is
when he either comes out with some sort of antagonistic,
you know, sarcastic response, or, he tries to manipulate my
seeing my children. And that's it! ((claps hand))

9

MB:

Mart?

C:

Well, uh, I think the .. I don't know what he wants of me.
He says he wants me to leave him alone while he's raising
his children I have never been in the way.

10
11
12
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By controlling the exchange of turns between the disputants, the
mediator limits the types of exchanges that can occur between
them. For example, when disputants' utterances are directed to
the mediators, they refer to the opposing disputant via the third
person. Their complaint is thus constructed as a story told to
the mediator rather than an accusation directed at the opposing
disputant (Garcia 1991).
In sum, disputants' self-representations in mediation vary
in terms of level of compliance with the speech exchange system of mediation and mediator control, but are never completely
unconstrained. Disputants representing themselves display an
orientation to the speech exchange system of mediation. Mediator
representation of disputant's positions will be considered in the
next section.
Mediator Representation: Paraphrasing,
Extending, and Replacing
Disputants in these data are often represented by mediators
who speak for them. The types of mediator representation that
occur, paraphrasing, extending, and replacing, will be discussed
in the order of the least to most intrusive. When paraphrasing, a
mediator repeats or rephrases a position expressed by a disputant.
When "extending," a mediator elaborates or revises a position
stated by a disputant, going beyond what was actually said by
that disputant. When "replacing," a mediator takes the place of a
disputant in the negotiation, expressing positions or justifications
that were not expressed by the disputant.
1. Paraphrasinga Disputant'sPosition.Paraphrasing (restating,
refrainng or rephrasing) is a technique often recommended for
enhancing communication in mediation (Donohue, Allen and
Burrell, 1988; Roberts, 1988, p. 65, 74; Cahn, 1992). Summarizing
a disputant's position may make that person feel understood and
may make the opposing disputant more willing to listen to the
position.
Excerpts 3, 4, and 5 show how a mediator may represent
a disputant by paraphrasing a disputant's expressed position.
These examples are from the dispute described above in which
a divorced couple negotiates visitation arrangements. In Excerpt
3 the complainant offers to give up two of his visitation days a
month (two Thursdays).
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Excerpt 3

"The twins said well what happened to Thursdays they, you know they
specifically brought that up to me and I said well, it looks like Mom wants
to spend more time with you two. So if you know you want to do Thursday,
Friday one week, and then just a Friday the next week, that's compromising
a little bit..."
A few minutes later the mediator "repeats" the complainant's
offer (Excerpt 4).6
Excerpt 4

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

M:
R:
M:
C:
M:
C:
C:
M:
C:
C:
M:

And then what I hear, is the last month or so, it's been
every other Thursday, and then that next week is uh for the
Friday, and you're not willing
Uh=
=to he's willing to relinquish! He used the word. Uh one
of those Fridays.
No=
=Instead of making it cons[iste]nt I MEAN THURSDAYS!
[No]
Thursdays ri:ght.
Instead of [makling it I just
I
[I
I'm willing to go along with the schedule that she said just
to keep the status quo and keep her happy that she's you
know,
Um hmh. He's offering the two Thursday night.

The mediator's reformulation of the complainant's offer differs
from it in several ways. First, the complainant's offer was directed

at the mediator and referred to the respondent in the third person.
The mediator's reformulation is directed at the respondent and
refers to the complainant in the third person (in line 5). Second,
the mediator describes the complainant as "relinquishing" two
days of visitation, while the complainant originally characterized
his offer as a "compromise." The mediator's paraphrase thus
presents the complainant's offer as giving something up to the
respondent.
After the mediator's reformulation, the complainant repeats
and gives a reason for this position (lines 13 and 14).
position
his
The complainant does not explicitly disagree with the mediator's
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representation of his position, but by rephrasing it and elaborating the reason for his position, he revises the version she presented. In this version he deletes his initial use of "compromise,"
and says he's willing to do what she (the respondent) proposed.
The mediator's second rephrasing (line 16) again emphasizes that
the complainant is offering something or giving something to the
respondent. However, the mediator's restatement does not repeat
the reasons for the position the complainant gave (line 14, "to keep
her happy").
A few minutes later in the hearing, the proposal to eliminate
two Thursdays of visitation a month is again under discussion. In
Excerpt 5 the mediator again "repeats" the complainant's offer,
emphasizing that the complainant is giving up something to the
respondent (line 1). The respondent acknowledges this restatement in line 2, but does not accept the proposal. The mediator
then adds to her characterization of the offer by repeating the
complainant's reason for his offer (lines 3 and 4). It is not until
this final representation of the offer that we see the first tentative
move towards acceptance on the part of the respondent (line 5).
Excerpt 5
1
2
3
4
5

M:
R:
M:
R:

And he is willing to give up two of those Thursdays.
I know.
Number one I heard it to make it consistent for the children,
and that that would please you!
I'll just I'll do it, just to meet him half way,

In sum, mediator paraphrases are never exact repetitions of
disputant's statements. Each time the mediator repeated the complainant's offer, she changed it slightly and emphasized different
aspects of it than the complainant had emphasized. How an offer is presented or represented may have an impact on how it
will be responded to by the opposing disputant. Paraphrasing is
therefore part of the work towards dispute resolution.
2. Extending or Elaborating a Disputant's Stated Position. The
second type of mediator representation in these data is extending
or elaborating a disputant's stated position. A mediator makes
an argument consistent with a disputant's expressed position,
but goes beyond what was actually said.
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For example, in Excerpt 6 from the dispute between the divorced couple, the respondent argues that their children should
spend more time at her house and less at the complainant's because they are spending too much time away from the "home
base" (lines 1-5). The complainant interrupts to challenge this
argument (lines 6 and 7). The mediator sanctions this breach
of mediation format (line 8), but then goes on to represent the
complainant's (Stan) expressed position in a dyadic exchange
with the respondent.
Excerpt 6
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

R:

C:
M:
C:
M:
R:
M:
R:
R:
M:
R:
M:
R:
M:

That I got the base, the home, family, and I feel that
Thursday, Friday, and Saturday without them be:ing,
consistently at home, is too much. I feel that it's too much.
Even though you don't get to see them, they're not at home, and
they're at school, and they're on the road,=
=They're home
seventy five percent of the time.
Stan wait.
Okay.
That's your feeling,
Right.
And you have every right to that. That is not his feeling,
a[nd that's] not how he sees his home base.
[I know ]
I know.
You know he sees it very loving, very whole, very consistent,
very disciplined.
I know!
Okay. For him that's what he sees and what we have to discuss.
I know.
And he's a fifty percent a parent, and you're fifty percent a
parent.

The mediator's explanation that the complainant also sees his
"home base" as loving, whole, consistent and disciplined is not
a restatement of what the complainant said, but it is consistent
with his position that the children should spend more time at his
house. Her statement "he's a fifty percent a parent, and you're fifty
percent a parent," is consistent with his complaint that "they're
home seventy five percent of the time," because that utterance
shows he's concerned about the inequality of the visitation
arrangements.
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In sum, "extension" includes instances where mediators represent a disputant by elaborating or extending a position taken
by that disputant in a previous utterance. This category differs
from paraphrasing, because the mediator goes beyond what was
actually said by the disputant. Thus the mediator is representing
a disputant's expressed position rather than re-presenting his or
her utterances.
3. Replacing the Disputant. When "replacing" the disputant,
the mediator does not restrict him or herself to representing the
disputant's expressed positions, she or he goes beyond what the
disputant said and argues in place of him or her. The mediator acts
as if he or she were a principal in the dispute, directly engaging
in negotiations with the opposing disputant.
For example, in Excerpt 7 from a hearing about the location
of the boundary line between two neighbors' properties, Mediators A and B take the place of the complainant in a negotiation
with Respondent A. The respondent had paid the county several
thousand dollars to build a culvert between the two properties
to solve a serious erosion problem. The respondent wanted the
complainant to reimburse him for part of this expense.
The respondent makes a proposal in lines 1 to 4. Mediator B
counters this proposal by explaining why the respondent should
not be compensated for his expenses (lines 5 - 8). The respondent
replies to this challenge (line 9) by referring to the history of the
agreement to put in the culvert which he had outlined earlier
in the hearing ("I went with a compromise with the county").
Mediator A challenges this argument by pointing out it was the
respondent who made the agreement, not the complainant (lines 13
and 14). The respondent explains why he made the agreement
without the complainant's participation (line 15). Mediator A
responds that he did it for his benefit (lines 16-17). The respondent
(lines 18 and 19) replies that it wasn't only himself that benefitted, the complainant benefitted also. Mediator A challenges this
argument as well, claiming that the respondent did not have the
right to make an agreement for the complainant (lines 20 to 23).
Having attacked the proposal on logical grounds, Mediator A introduces procedural grounds for not considering the respondent's
proposal (lines 23 to 28).
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Excerpt 7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

RA:

MB:

RA:
MA:
MB:
RA:
MA:
RA:
MA:
RA:
MA:

Damned for my troubles that I went through, and the money
that I paid the county to improve his property and getting
the base rock fill, and everything else, that he should
compensate me for part of my expenses.
Let's try to understand one thing, Mister Cartel, the work
and the money that you expended in putting in this culvert,
and actually rescuing your property from destruction, you
did it, for your sake.
I went with a compromise with the county,
Yes.
Yes.
That I would take my fences and they would accept the
You went with the compromise with the county, not these
folks. You went there. You did it.
They wouldn't have done it,
You decided it was worth it to you to do it, otherwise you
wouldn't [have ]
[It's not] only to my advantage, though I'm
protecting my neighbor's advantage also.
THAT is something you were giving your neighbors
unwittingly. You were between a rock and a hard place. I
will agree! But you can not, you could not have committed
them to something they didn't agree to. Now, if you feel that
equity is on your side. Then you can after the fact sue them
for their share. If you feel that you want to do arbitration on
that you can do that. But we're talking about something else
here. Remember we defined the area. You put five thousand
dollars in there but that wasn't his statement of the problem.

In this excerpt both mediators, while representing the complainant's interests, go beyond what the complainant actually
said in the hearing.
In sum, when "replacing" a disputant in a negotiation with the
opposing disputant, the mediator is representing their interests in
a far more radical way than when paraphrasing or extending. The
mediators negotiate instead of the disputant, rather than merely
representing what that disputant has expressed.
When mediators represent a disputant by "replacing" him
or her in an exchange, they also intervene in the opposing disputant's self representation, by challenging that disputant's positions. The opposing disputant is thus led to change their position,
or their justification for that position. For example, in excerpt 7
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above mediators A and B refused to accept Respondent A's position, and refuted every justification for that position he attempted.
Summary
In sum, there are no instances of "pure" self-representation
in these hearings, because disputants' actions are shaped in orientation to the speech exchange system of mediation. By such
actions as addressing their remarks to the mediator rather than
the opposing disputant, speaking only when offered the floor
by a mediator, referring to the opposing disputant in the third
person, and limiting their remarks to the topics specified by the
mediators, the disputants exhibit a controlled degree of freedom
of expression. Thus, the greatest disputant autonomy in these
mediation hearings occurs when disputants represent themselves
within the confines of the speech exchange system of mediation.
The three types of mediator representation of disputants' positions involve varying degrees of intervention into disputants'
statements. Mediators' paraphrasing of disputants' positions reproduce most closely what the disputants actually said. However,
as shown above, even restating or rephrasing may change the
message produced by the disputant. The mediator may choose to
convey only parts of the disputant's position in their restatement
or may reformulate it. Mediators' restatements of disputant's
positions and offers thus change them in ways that may have
implications for the resolution of the dispute. When extending or
elaborating a disputant's position, mediators go beyond what the
disputant actually said, although their utterances remain consistent with the disputant's stated position.
Finally, mediators may go beyond representation to replacement of the disputant in the negotiation process. In these cases
mediators take the place of a disputant in an exchange with the
opposing disputant. In the next section I explore the implications
of mediators' "replacement" for the dispute resolution process.
Implications of "Replacement" for
the Dispute Resolution Process
When "Replacement" is used to challenge a disputant's position, they may be put under great pressure to change their
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position. Excerpts 8,9, and 10 are from a dispute between an auto
repair shop and a vehicle owner over repairs done to that vehicle.
As excerpt 8 begins, the complainant reminds the mediators that
in addition to the items that were not repaired correctly, a new
problem emerged when the car was at the repair shop-a cracked
water pump housing. Mediator A then replaces the respondents
in order to disagree with the complainant.
Excerpt 8
C:
MA:

We're also forgetting the water pump was not leaking when I
brought it in there. Somebody could have whacked it with a
hammer for all I know.
Who cares? And, and you could have broken two minutes after
you drove out of the garage. Nobody's ever going to be able
to decide when it cracked.

Such aggressive mediator representation, and intrusion into disputants' self representation, may lead to resolution, but at a cost.
For example, the complainant in this hearing eventually agrees
with the solution proposed by the mediators, but only reluctantly.
Excerpt 9 shows the complainant's response to being told he
would have to pay about $400 more for the vehicle repair than
expected.
Excerpt 9
"I'm not happy with it at all. Well I mean there's got to be some, some
recourse for people who don't know any better, that take vehicles to people,
and this, they let them go out like that. They had it a week and a half, they
had the vehicle."

After another two minutes of discussion in which Mediators A
and B work to persuade the complainant that his desire for a
lower bill is not warranted, the complainant reluctantly agrees to
the amount the Mediators suggested:
Excerpt 10
"Well I guess I have no other recourse. Basically, so, pay it up and uh.

.

Although the mediators were able to get the complainant to
agree to the solution they suggested, he did so only reluctantly,
and with explicitly stated reservations.
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Implications of "Replacement" for Disputant Autonomy,
Mediator Neutrality, and Disputant Compliance
This sociological analysis of the interactional process of
mediation hearings has shown how disputants' positions are represented by disputants and mediators, and explored the implications of those representations for the unfolding negotiation. Both
constructive and potentially problematic results of representation
were identified. With regard to disputant self representation, I
showed how the interactional organization of mediation and the
actions of the mediators created a safe and constructive environment for disputants to represent themselves, such that the
inflammatory effects of conflictual utterances are lessened (see
also Garcia 1991).
The impact of mediator representation varies with the type of
representation. Paraphrasing can contribute to the dispute resolution process by allowing the mediator to reframe or repackage
a disputant's position in a form more acceptable to the opposing
disputant. When extending a disputant's position, mediators can
effectively communicate that perspective without allowing direct
confrontation between the parties.
Forms of mediator representation such as paraphrasing and
extending a disputant's position may thus have positive consequences for the dispute resolution process. By representing
disputants with limited ability to speak for themselves, mediators may create equality between the disputants, thus "leveling
the playing field" (Cooks and Hale, 1994, p. 63-4; Irving and
Benjamin, 1987; Regehr, 1994, p. 366). Mediator representation
of disputants' positions is therefore not in itself a problem.
However, several potential problems became apparent in
these data with the third type of mediator representation, replacing the disputant. Disputant autonomy is decreased for both the
disputant who is being replaced (whose interests are represented
by the mediator) and the disputant who is being challenged by
the mediator. The replaced disputant looses the opportunity to
present his or her own reasons and justifications for his or her
positions. The opposing disputant who is challenged is further
pressured to revise his or her positions. Replacement may lead to
the opposing disputant being pressured to accept a solution. The
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moral force of the mediator, and their authority in the hearing
may give them the persuasive or coercive power to get a disputant to give in. Thus, the extent of mediator intervention in the
dispute resolution process which "replacement" entails may not
be appropriate for community mediation.
In addition, an examination of research on mediation suggests several other possible outcomes of mediator replacement of
disputants.
1. "Replacement" may decreasesuccess and user satisfaction.
In general, research shows high rates of success (generally
defined as reaching agreement) and user satisfaction for mediation programs. 7 Active mediator intervention has been shown
by some researchers to be positively related to success and satisfaction (e.g., Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille, 1991, p. 16, and
Kimsey, Fuller, Bell, and McKinney, 1994). However, the types of
intervention described by these researchers is much less coercive
than the "replacement" type of representation found in these data
(for example, see Tidwell, 1994, and Donohue, et al., 1988).
Some research connects dis-empowerment of disputants with
failure to reach an agreement (Kelly and Gigy, 1989, p. 274).
Merry's (1989) study suggests that settlement may be related to
mediators avoiding appearing to coerce or pressure disputants
(p. 244). Kelly and Gigy's (1989, p. 279) results also suggest that
there may be a relationship between successful mediation and mediator restraint: 75% of the divorcing couples reaching an agreement felt the mediators "did not impose their viewpoint, and
were impartial." Thus the more extreme type of mediator intervention, replacement, may reduce mediation's success rate and
user satisfaction.
2. "Replacement" may decrease compliance with agreements.
Another potential risk of mediator replacement of disputants
in negotiations is that disputants may feel pressured to accept
a solution they are unenthusiastic about. In general, mediation
practitioners agree that compliance will be greater when disputants create their own agreement than when a third party imposes a solution on them (Silbey 1987, p. 415; Cahn, 1992, p.4 3 ).
Blades (1985), Burrell, Donohue, and Allen, 1990, and Pearson
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and Thoennes (1984; 1988) found that compliance with mediated
agreements was greater than with adjudicated agreements. Reluctant agreement with solutions may reduce compliance rates,
and hence mediation's effectiveness (Regehr, 1994, p. 361; Irving
and Benjamin, 1987).
3. "Replacement" may decrease mediator impartialityor neutrality.
When a mediator directly supports a disputant's position,
and disagrees with the opposing disputant's position, a posture
of neutrality may be difficult to support (see Cook and Hale,
1994, p. 63 and Cobb and Rifkin, 1991, p. 70 for similar arguments). Research has identified a relationship between mediator
trust, impartiality, or neutrality and mediation outcomes (Karim
and Dilts, 1990; Fuller, Kimsey and McKinney, 1992, Kimsey, et
al., 1994, p. 89). Cooks and Hale (1994) include disputant selfdetermination, informed consent, mediator impartiality, and mediator neutrality as essential components of ethical mediation.
Because of the frequent occurrence of "replacement" in these
data, I conclude that the style of mediation practiced in the program studied is more similar to the "deal-making" style than the
"orchestrating" style Kolb (1983) identified. The informal structure of mediation, and the less rigidly defined roles and procedures give the mediators several avenues of more or less subtle
influence over the outcome of the process. If the goal of alternative
conflict resolution procedures, such as mediation, is empowering
disputants to make their own decisions, perhaps the role of the
mediator needs to be re-thought. If mediators are taking an active
role in negotiation, shaping and revising disputants' positions,
and speaking in their place, a less than optimal degree of disputant autonomy may exist.
Mediation programs in the U.S. vary greatly in their structure
8
and in how the role of mediator is enacted. Thus these results
should not be considered generalizable to other mediation programs until empirically tested. Cahn (1992, p. 70) points out that
"the role of the interventionist in divorce mediation" has been understudied. Further research is also necessary on the relationship
between interventionist mediator strategies, such as replacement,
and disputant's compliance with agreements.
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Notes

1. Cobb and Rifkin (1991) point out that in some mediation ideologies this type
of representation is considered legitimate mediator practice, as long as it is
applied to both sides in a dispute.
2. One hearing, a dispute between a divorced couple over care of their children,
is chaired by only one mediator.
3. The turn-taking system (Sacks et al., 1974, pp. 703-4), consists of the rules
and procedures participants use to exchange turns talking. In ordinary conversation, turn transition properly occurs at the end of a "unit type" (e.g.,
sentence, clause, or phrase). Speakers can select another to speak (e.g., by
asking a question). If current speaker does not select a next, any participant
may speak. If a next speaker does not self select, the current speaker may
continue. Turns at talking and types of turns (e.g., questions and answers) are
not predetermined or controlled by conventions, structures, or individuals
outside the interaction, but are negotiated in the context of the talk itself.
Turn-taking in mediation is partly pre-allocated, as in trials (Atkinson and
Drew, 1979), and news interviews (Clayman, 1987; Greatbatch, 1988; Heritage
and Greatbatch, 1991).
4. For any given interaction, the participation framework describes what patterns of participation and address occur (Goffman, 1981). Participants in
ordinary conversation negotiate their participation status (e.g., ratified participant vs. bystander, addressed vs. non-addressed recipient) in the context
of the talk.
5. Speakers in the transcript excerpts are identified with the initials of their
institutional roles: C is a complainant; R is a respondent; M is a mediator.
If more than one person holds a specific role, the parties are labelled A and
B (e.g., MA is Mediator A). The transcripts have been simplified for ease
of reading. Pseudonyms have been used for all proper nouns. The following symbols are adopted from Gail Jefferson's system for transcription (see
Atkinson and Heritage, 1984): A dash indicates a word was cut off abruptly.
Underlining indicates stress or emphasis. Capital letters indicate increased
volume. Words in parentheses are tentative transcriptions. Brackets indicate
when two or more people are speaking simultaneously. Equal signs indicate
one word is attached to another.
6. Post-modernists argue that representation as conceived by modernists is not
possible. There is no such thing as simple representation. The message is
always changed when it is repeated.
The underlying assumption of modem representation that it is possible to
present something over again, to replace one object (concept, person, place,
or time) with another, without loss of content or violation of intention. The
post-modernists say this is impossible. (Rosenau, 1992, p. xiv).
While agreeing that "pure" representation may not be possible, I would
argue that people still "do" representation, and act as if a position has been
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represented. Representation as a practical accomplishment is the focus of this
paper.
7. For example, Kressell (1985) found divorce mediation settlement rates ranging from 22-97%, with most programs settling 40-70% of cases. Kelly and
Gigy (1989) found that 57% of divorce mediation cases in the program studied reach agreement. Silbey (1987, p. 419) found that 84% of families using
a parent-adolescent mediation program reached agreement. 83% of these
families were satisfied with the mediation process. Kelly and Gigy's study
(1989, p. 278) also found that 78% of the men, and 72% of the women, were
satisfied with mediation. Bautz and Hill (1989) found that 70-90% of divorced
couples were satisfied with mediation. Kressell (1987, p. 69) found that 7090% of the couples surveyed were pleased with mediation, a significantly
higher rate than those whose divorces were handled by the courts.
8. For example, hearings may be chaired by one to three or more mediators
(Cerino and Rainone, 1984). Mediation may be accomplished through caucuses (a series of private meetings between the mediator and individual
disputants), through joint sessions, or through some combination of the two
(Wahrhaftig, 1983; Felstiner and Williams, 1978; Kolb, 1981).
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